Keeping Clean Waters Clean: Making the Clean Water Act\u27s Antidegradation Policy Work by Chilson, John A.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 32
1999 
Keeping Clean Waters Clean: Making the Clean Water Act's 
Antidegradation Policy Work 
John A. Chilson 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Legislation Commons, 
Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John A. Chilson, Keeping Clean Waters Clean: Making the Clean Water Act's Antidegradation Policy Work, 
32 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 545 (1999). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol32/iss3/5 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
KEEPING CLEAN WATERS CLEAN: MAKING THE CLEAN
WATER ACT'S ANTIDEGRADATION POLICY WORK
John A. Chilson*
This Note stresses the importance of making the Clean Water Act's antidegrada-
tion policy work in order to avoid a system of national waters of equally mediocre
quality. The Nation's highest quality and most important waters are not receiv-
ing appropriate protection under the Act because the antidegradation policy
contains vague definitions, the states fail to review water quality standards every
three years and to entertain citizens' petitions, and the Environmental Protection
Agency has not taken an active role in ensuring compliance with federal stan-
dards. This Note examines the schemes of the Great Lakes States and Florida and
hypothesizes that similar provisions might improve the Clean Water Act's effec-
tiveness by bolstering the currently stagnant federal antidegradation policy.
Maintaining and enhancing our environment, passing on a
clean world to future generations, is a sacred obligation of
citizenship. We all have an interest in clean air, pure water,
safe food, and protected natural treasures. Our environment
is, literally, our common ground.'
In 1972, Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA or Act)2
to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological in-
tegrity of the Nation's waters., 3 The objective of the Act is twofold:
to clean up polluted waters4 and to keep clean waters clean.5 To
facilitate pollution clean-up, the Act requires each state to institute
federally-approved comprehensive water quality standards that set
* Article. Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 32, 1999. B.S.
1991, United States Naval Academy; J.D. 1999, University of Michigan Law School. I would
like to thank the editorial board, particularly Kendra Cheves, for their excellent edits and
hard work on this Note, Professor Neil Kagan for his advice, and especially my family for
their invaluable support and encouragement.
1. President William J. Clinton, Protecting Public Health and Our Environment (visited
Feb. 15, 1999) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/SOTU98/enviro.html> (proposing a new
Clean Water Initiative to fulfill the promise of the Clean Water Act on Mar. 19, 1997).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
3. Id. § 1251(a).
4. "In 1972,... [t]he Potomac River was clogged with algae blooms and unsafe to
swim. Lake Erie was dying. The Cuyohoga River was so polluted it burst into flames. Many
rivers and beaches were little more than open sewers." Gore Launches New Strategy to Protect
America's Waters, U.S. NEWSWxRE, Oct. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13913782 (describing
the advances made in cleaning up pollution in America's waters since the passage of the
CWA).
5. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a).
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goals for all intrastate waters.6 States must designate uses of their
navigable waters (including all lakes, rivers, streams, ponds, and
marshlands) and develop water quality criteria based upon those
designated uses. The CWA requires that these "state standards be
sufficient to maintain existing beneficial uses of navigable waters,
preventing their further degradation."8 The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's (EPA or Agency) implementing regulations
promulgate a federal antidegradation policy9 and require state wa-
ter quality standards to include "a statewide antidegradation
policy" to ensure that the "level of water quality necessary to pro-
tect the existing uses shall be maintained and protected."0
The federal antidegradation policy establishes three tiers of pro-
tection." The Tier III designation, exclusive to the Nation's most
6. See id. §§ 1311(b) (1) (C), 1313. The CWA assigns responsibility for administering
its provisions to the Environmental Protection Agency. See id. § 1251(d). The EPA was cre-
ated in 1970 as part of Reorganization Plan No. 3. See Pub. L. No. 98-80, § 2(a) (2), (b) (2),
(c)(2)(C), 84 Stat. 2086, 2086-87 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)). The
Agency produced its finalized implementing regulations in 1975. See EPA, WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS HANDBOOK INT-2 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
7. See § 1313(c) (2) (A). Water quality criteria "are elements of State water quality stan-
dards, expressed as constituent concentrations, levels, or narrative statements, representing
a quality of water that supports a particular use. When criteria are met, water quality will
generally protect the designated use." HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at GLOSS-3.
8. PUD No. I ofJefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 705
(1994) (citing § 1313(d) (4) (B)).
9. The EPA inherited its federal antidegradation policy from the Department of the
Interior, which was previously responsible for environmental matters and had revealed its
policy of antidegradation on February 8, 1968. See EPA, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON: AN-
TIDEGRADATION 1 (1985) in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at APP. G, [hereinafter QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS]. The antidegradation policy was included in the EPA's first water quality
standards regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 55,340-41 (1975), but the CWA did not originally con-
tain an explicit reference to a federal antidegradation policy. See Alessandro G. Olivieri,
Note, New York's Antidegradation Policy: An Analysis of Its Compliance with Federal Standards and
Its Vulnerability to Legal Challenges, 17 COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 205, 206 (1992) (citing Pub. L. No.
100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.)). A 1987
amendment to the CWA, the Water Quality Act, formally included this existing antidegrada-
tion policy in the CWA for the first time. See id. at 206-07; see also QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS,
supra, at 1. The Water Quality Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (4) (B), amended the CWA to provide
that, where the quality of waters identified under § 1313(d)(1)(A) "equals or exceeds levels
necessary to protect the designated use for such waters or otherwise required by applicable
water quality standards [promulgated by the EPA] ... [its water quality standard] may be
revised only if such revision is subject to and consistent with the antidegradation policy
established under this section." § 1313(d) (4) (B).
10. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(1)-(3) (1996); see also PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County, 511
U.S. at 705 (discussing state obligations under the federal antidegradation scheme) (citing
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1370; 40 C.F.R. § 131.4(a) (1996)).
11. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a) (1)-(3). All waters are designated within the three tier sys-
tem. The lowest level of protection, Tier I, necessarily applies to all bodies of water unless
they have received Tier II or Tier III designation. Tier I, therefore, establishes a minimum
level of water quality for all waters in the United States. See id. § 131.12(a)(1). The Tier II
designation applies to waters that already exceed the levels "necessary to support propaga-
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pristine and highest quality waters, provides the greatest level of
protection against pollution.1 2 Tier III waters, also known as Out-
standing National Resource Waters (ONRWs), generally may not
be degraded for any reason.13
Although much attention has centered around the effort to
clean up polluted waters since the CWA's passage,'4 the statute's
mandate to preserve the quality of clean waters has been largely
ignored.15 The federal antidegradation policy's procedure has
failed because states have designated fewer than one-half of one
percent of America's river miles as ONRWs. 16 Without ONRW pro-
tection, some of our Nation's highest quality waters have been
allowed to deteriorate.17 The remaining pristine waters need im-
mediate protection to prevent their deterioration. 
8
tion of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation in and on the water," and only allows a
reduction in quality when "necessary to accommodate important economic or social devel-
opment." Id. § 131.12(a) (2).
12. See id. § 131.12(a) (3).
13. See id. The only exception allows temporary changes in quality. See Water Quality
Standards Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,400, 51,403 (1983).
14. See, e.g., Gore Launches New Strategy to Protect Americas Waters, supra note 4; Wythe
Keever, On the Rebound: Lake Erie's Recovery is Substantial, HARRISBURG PATRIOT & EVENING.
NEWS, Apr. 2, 1990, at A4 (describing the recovery of Lake Erie); John Lancaster, The Poto-
mac's Remarkable Improvement; Plants, Fish Come Back and Some Spots Are Clean Enough for
Swimming, COG Says, WASH. POST, May 14, 1987, at DI (describing the recovery of the Po-
tomac River).
15. See NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, WATERS AT RISK: KEEPING CLEAN WATERS
CLEAN 1 (1992) [hereinafter WATERS AT RISK] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform) (explaining that the EPA and state environmental agencies have spent bil-
lions of dollars on the clean-up effort while ignoring the equally important goal of
antidegradation).
16. See id. at 4. The statistics used throughout this Note are derived from a National
Wildlife Federation study. See id. at 13-18. The NWF surveyed all state environmental agen-
cies, asking them to determine, among other things, the extent to which "states have
actually identified and designated eligible waters." Id. at 13. The NWF requested that each
state estimate the percentage of "stream miles" and surface acreage of lakes that are desig-
nated as federal and state outstanding resource waters. See id. at Appendix B, 38-39. The
NWF uses the term "river miles" in its discussion of the percentages of state waters that have
received either federal or state ONRW protection. See id. at 17-18.
17. See id. at vii.
18. See id.
[O]ur national fixation on cleaning up the nation's most polluted water resources to
minimally acceptable standards has blinded us to the imminent decline of existing
pristine water bodies. If the current course remains unchanged, the consequence of
continued neglect of outstanding water resources in the United States will be equally
mediocre water quality everywhere... Federal and state governments' laissez-faire poli-
cies have placed at risk the fate of such notable natural wonders as Lake Superior,
Flathead Lake in Montana, the coastal waters of Acadia National Park in Maine, and
the Florida Keys.
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This Note argues that the federal antidegradation scheme is in-
effective because: (1) the policy contains vague definitions; (2)
states fail to review water quality standards every three years and to
entertain citizens' petitions; and (3) the EPA has not taken an ac-
tive role in ensuring compliance with federal standards. 9 States
may impose more stringent water quality controls than required by
the federal regulations20 but they may not adopt lower standards
or fail to revise water quality assessments when necessary.2' Al-
though the EPA must review revisions to a state's existing
antidegradation scheme22 and any newly-instituted water quality
23
standards, the Agency has historically sidestepped its duty to re-
view existing state antidegradation policies.24 Because existing state
standards, which have proven ineffective in maintaining water
Id.; see generally Christie C. Morgan, Challenges and Opportunities in Protecting Outstanding
National Resource Waters, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1991, at 30, 30 (describing the
viability of the federal ONRW concept).
19. See WATERS AT RISK, supra note 15, at 2.
20. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(c), 1370 (1994). The federal antidegradation policy
effectively establishes the absolute minimum water quality standards which may be adopted
in the United States. See PUD No. 1 ofJefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511
U.S. 700, 705 (1994) (stating that "[a]t a minimum, state water quality standards must satisfy
[the] conditions" of the "antidegradation policy established under the [CWA]" (citing 33
U.S.C. § 1313(d) (4) (B) (1994)).
21. See§§ 1311(b)(1) (c), 1370.
22. The CWA requires a state to review its existing water quality standards at least
every three years and to revise those standards as appropriate. See § 1313(c) (1) ("The Gov-
ernor of a State ... shall from time to time (but at least once each three year period...)
hold public hearings for the purpose of reviewing applicable water quality standards and, as
appropriate, modifying and adopting those standards."). The EPA's regulations require the
Agency to review and approve standards. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.20(c) (1996) ("The State shall
submit the results of the review.., to the Regional Administrator for review and approval,
within 30 days of the final State action to adopt and certify the revised standard, or if no
revisions are made as a result of the review, within 30 days of the completion of the re-
view.").
23. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.20(c)(1996).
24. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding
that the EPA's reasonable interpretation of its own regulations must be given deference by
the court); Envtl. Defense Fund v.. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 293 n. 53 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding
that since the seven states in the Colorado River Basin-Arizona, California, Colorado, New
Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming-had not yet submitted revised or new water quality
standards for salinity, the EPA was under no duty to prepare and publish proposed regula-
tions as required by the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 303(c)(4) (A) (1994)); Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) v. Fox, 909 F. Supp. 153, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that New York's
1992 submission of revised water quality standards did not trigger the mandatory duty to
review by the EPA required under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2) (1994), despite a chal-
lenge by the NRDC that New York's revised standards did not include an adequate
antidegradation policy as required by 40 C.F.R. § 130.6 (1996)).
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quality, are not reviewed by the EPA, states have no immediate in-
centive to revise and improve the quality of their bodies of water."
Part I of this Note describes the legislative and administrative
framework of the antidegradation policy. It explores the EPA's ef-
fort to implement and manage the mandates of the CWA and the
EPA's antidegradation regulations.
Part II examines the weaknesses of the regulatory framework
outlined in Part I by discussing three interrelated problems with
the current antidegradation policy. First, the EPA's antidegrada-
tion policy fails to adequately define ONRW.26 That failure creates
implementation problems for state agencies tasked with managing
the antidegradation policy2 7 and allows states to prioritize eco-
nomic development and conservation of diminishing monetary
resources over designation, maintenance, and protection of
ONRWs.2 s Second, although the CWA establishes the right of citi-
zen interest groups to petition state environmental agencies to
designate water bodies as ONRWs, 9 it does not require agencies to
respond to those requests.3 0 Third, the EPA is only required to re-
view new or revised state policies.3' The current policy creates a
strong incentive for state administrators to maintain the status quo
in order to avoid involvement by the EPA.32 As a result, states too
often fail to revise their standards when their water bodies deserve
a higher designation.33 These three regulatory weaknesses have re-
sulted in unworkable and ineffective management of the CWA's
antidegradation policy.
Part III provides specific CWA reform proposals and suggests
how the courts may improve the Act's effectiveness. It examines
the schemes of the Great Lakes States and Florida and hypothe-
sizes that similar provisions might bolster the federal
25. The only incentive a state has under the current antidegradation policy is the de-
sire to protect its own waters. This Note assumes that good intentions, alone, are not
enough to make the policy work.
26. See40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a) (3) (1996); Morgan, supra note 18, at 31.
27. See discussion infra Part II.
28. See Morgan, supra note 18, at 32.
29. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (b) (1994).
30. Organized interest groups have a greater chance of influencing administrative
outcomes. SeeJohn Tierney, Organized Interests and the Nation's Capitol in THE POLITICS OF
INTERESTS: INTEREST GROUPS TRANSFORMED 216-17 (Mark P. Petracca ed., 1992)
(describing the ways that organized interests make a difference in congressional politics and
policymaking).
31. See § 1313(c) (2) (A), (c)(3); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1127
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
32. See discussion infra Part II.B.
33. See Brief for Appellant at 22, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (No. 96-5366) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief] (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform).
SPRING 1999]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
antidegradation plan. First, the Act should include a specific work-
ing definition for the term ONRW, currently described only by
ambiguous examples. States will then be able to objectively deter-
mine whether a water body fits within the definition. Second, the
CWA's provision for citizens' petition rights should require state
agencies to reply to petitions within six months. Third, to diminish
the current incentive states have to avoid revising their existing
policies, Congress should amend the CWA to require states to
submit water quality review results at least every three years and to
require the EPA to review those results, whether or not states have
elected to revise their standards. Courts can hold the states and the
EPA accountable for failing to comply with the CWA's reporting
requirements by recognizing a constructive submission doctrine.3
4
By establishing a clear, bright-line definition of ONRW and by re-
quiring a more proactive and protective stance by state
environmental agencies and the EPA, in the form of periodic re-
views of existing standards and mandated responses to citizen
petitions, the CWA's second goal will finally be attainable.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK
In 1972, Congress responded to the dangerous pollution levels
in U.S. lakes, rivers, and coastal waters by passing the CWA.3 5 The
CWA requires states to establish water quality standards for every
36body of water within their borders. States must: (1) designate
uses, such as recreational, agricultural, or industrial, for each body
of water; (2) set specific limits on the levels of pollutants allowable
in light of those designated uses; and (3) promulgate an antide-
34. This doctrine, crafted in response to state failures to submit required reports,
"allow[s] EPA to take federal action without relying upon a submission by the states." Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n. v. Browner, No. CIV.A/95-1811, 1996 WL 601451 (D.D.C. 1996), at *3 n.4
(recognizing that states sometimes need additional incentives to comply with federal re-
quirements).
35. See I SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93d CONG., 2D SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 1419-28 (Comm.
Print 1973); Statement of Current Policy & Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 43
Fed. Reg. 29,588 (1978); Sen. Edmund S. Muskie, A Legislator's View of Impending Amendments
to the Water Pollution Control Act, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 629, 629 (1972); see alsoJef-
frey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 36
VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1180-86 (1983) (discussing the legislative history of the CWA); Gore
Launches New Strategy to Protect America's Waters, supra note 4.
36. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994).
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gradation policy designed to protect existing uses and preserve the
present condition of the waters. 7
A. The Antidegradation Scheme
The EPA's implementing regulations include a pyramid-style an-
tidegradation structure s with three general levels of protection for
water bodies.39 Tier I establishes the minimum level of water qual-
ity that must be maintained in every body of water.40 Specifically,
Tier I provides for the protection and maintenance of the water
quality necessary to preserve all existing uses of a water body.4' For
example, a lake used for fishing, boating, and drinking water must
maintain qualities which preserve those uses.
Tier II provides the protection "necessary to support propaga-
tion of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation in and on the
water" to waters whose quality already exceeds the Tier I level and
allows a reduction in quality only when "necessary to accommo-
date important economic or social development." 42 Tier II waters
receive more protection than Tier I waters to maintain their
higher quality unless a state determines during a water quality
standards review that it needs to reduce water quality to foster
some type of important development.
43
Tier III applies to select water bodies of very high quality. The
designation prohibits any degradation of existing water quality
standards, except on a temporary basis."
37. See40 C.F.R. § 131.10-.12 (1996).
38. See id. § 131.12(a)(1)-(3); Morgan, supra note 18, at 30. Essentially, the pyramid
demonstrates the rough percentages of waters which should be grouped within the three
tiers. Tier I waters occupy the base and represent all waters not receiving a higher designa-
tion. Tier II waters, occupying the middle of the pyramid, represent a large number of
water bodies, but fewer than those in the first tier. Tier III waters occupy the pinnacle of the
pyramid, enjoying the maximum amount of antidegradation protection. The pyramid's
pinnacle category necessarily contains the fewest number of qualifying waters. See id.
39. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a) (1)-(3).
40. See id. § 131.12(a) (1).
41. See id.
42. Id. § 131.12(a) (2). Interests which might be considered important for economic
or social development include attracting or retaining industry along the banks of a lake and
developing a new lakeside condominium complex.
43. See id.
44. See id. § 131.12(a)(3); Water Quality Standards Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,400,
51,403 (1983). The concept of a third tier to protect outstanding water resources originated
from the proposal of an environmental public interest group during the EPA's original
public notice and comment phase preceding the promulgation of its first antidegradation
regulations. See N. William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts:
The Erratic Pursuit of Clear Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. REv. 643, 678-79 (1977). The
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B. The Federal and State Balance
Passage of the CWA created a system of "cooperative federal-
ism" 45  between federal and state governmental agencies
responsible for environmental regulation. 6 Congress established a
system subjecting state water quality programs, including antide-
41gradation policies, to federal review.
The CWA requires states to review their water quality standards
at least once every three years (triennial review) 8 States must
submit the results of this review to the EPA,49 which is responsible
for reviewing any new or revised standards adopted by the states to
determine whether the states have placed water bodies within ap-
propriate antidegradation tiers.50 If the EPA disapproves the
standards, states have ninety days to revise and resubmit them.51 If
they fail to resubmit compliant standards, the EPA becomes obli-
52gated to promulgate standards for the states.
States remain ultimately responsible for their own pollution
clean-up and antidegradation programs, however. 3 The EPA's role
is simply to ensure compliance with federal standards, not to de-
cide what water quality standards states should adopt. 4 While the
EPA may not want to intrude upon state sovereignty, reviewing
state water quality standards to ensure federal compliance is not an
abuse of federal regulatory power. In fact, the EPA's failure to re-
ONRW designation was added to the Department of Interior's original, generic concept of
an antidegradation policy, first mentioned in a report on interstate pollution in 1968. See id.
45. Mark T. Pifher, The Clean Water Act: Cooperative Federalism?, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Summer 1997, 34, 34 (1997) (discussing the tensions that exist between the EPA and
state governments concerning implementation of the CWA's water quality standards and
antidegradation provisions). By essentially adopting Interior's existing policy, which relied
exclusively on state implerientation, the EPA became the overseer of a federal antidegrada-
tion policy that to this day relies primarily on state interpretation and enforcement. See
Hines, supra note 44, at 697-700 (discussing "the degree of reliance that can be placed on
the states to implement the policy faithfully").
46. "[I] t is the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary re-
sponsibilities and rights of states to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan
the development and use ... of land and water resources... " Pifher, supra note 45, at 34
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (b)); Gaba, supra note 35, at 1167 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)).
47. See Pifher, supra note 45, at 34; Gaba, supra note 35, at 1168.
48. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (1994).
49. See id. § 1313(c) (2) (A).
50. See id. § 1313(c) (2) (A), (c) (3). The EPA's antidegradation pyramid serves as the
minimum standard for each tier of waters. See discussion supra Part I.A.
51. See § 1313 (c) (3), (4).
52. See id.; see also Pifher, supra note 45, at 34.
53. See§ 1313(c) (3), (4).
54. See Gaba, supra note 35, at 1188.
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view state standards may result in compliance problems with fed-
eral law.55
II. IMPLEMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS
The CWA does not clearly define the antidegradation policy.
56
States, attempting to comply with the federal policy, have been
forced to interpret the policy individually, define terms, and bal-
ance antidegradation policy interests with other important
regulatory objectives.57
A. No Workable Definition of ONRW in the CWA
The CWA's implementing regulations provide little guidance to
help states identify ONRWs. The regulations suggest that ONRWs
must be "high quality waters" constituting "outstanding National
resource(s)" and give examples of ONRWs as "waters of National
and State parks and wildlife refuges and waters of exceptional rec-
reational or ecological significance."58 Essentially the regulations
define Tier III waters as higher. quality waters than those desig-
nated as Tier II waters.59 Therefore, ONRWs are those bodies of
water whose quality exceeds "levels necessary to support propaga-
tion of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation in and on the
water."6°
1. Instituting Uncertain Requirements-The EPA uses examples to
define Tier III "high quality" waters. While some examples are suf-
• 61
ficienfly narrow and specific, the broadest and most
55. See discussion infra Part 11.C.
56. The only mention of a federal "antidegradation policy" in the CWA was added
through a 1987 amendment which served the purpose of making clear that the original
Act's reference to maintaining the integrity of the country's waters contained what was pre-
viously only implicit-an antidegradation policy. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v.
Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 705 (1994). The Act permits downward revi-
sions of state water quality standards "only if such revision is subject to and consistent with
the antidegradation policy established under this section." 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (4) (B).
57. See discussion infra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2. See also Pifher, supra note 45, at 36.
58. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a) (3) (1996).
59. Compare § 131.12(a) (2) (defining Tier II waters), with § 131.12(a) (3) (defining
Tier III waters).
60. § 131.12(a) (2).
61. The examples of "waters of National and State parks and wildlife refuges" are ade-
quately specific. § 131.12(a) (3).
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comprehensive examples62 fail as vague attempts to provide objec-
tive guidance. As a consequence, states attempting to comply with
the EPA's ONRW antidegradation category do not have a clear
understanding of which waters demand Tier III protection. In fact,
states have responded with their own definitions of ONRW,63 a re-
sult contrary to achieving consistency among state water quality
standards.
Environmental groups have encouraged states to rely on lan-
guage in the EPA regulation's preamble to expand the scope of
the ONRW definition." The preamble describes the ONRW desig-
nation as a protection of the highest quality waters for which
ordinary use classifications and water quality criteria are inade-
65quate. It also advises that ONRWs may include "waters of
'ecological significance' 
. .. which are important, unique or sensi-
tive ecologically, but whose water quality as measured by the
traditional parameters (dissolved oxygen and pH, etc.) may not be
particularly high or whose character cannot be adequately de-
scribed by these parameters. ''66 The regulation's preamble suggests
that waters with special ecological qualities may qualify as ONRWs,
67even if they do not exhibit high quality by traditional parameters.
While the preamble's additional criterion theoretically increases
the number of waters that might qualify for the designation, it con-
tinues to lack specificity because the terms "important," "unique,"
and "sensitive" are also vague.
A particularly destructive interpretation of the term "high qual-
ity" in the ONRW regulation originated within one of the EPA's
regional offices.Y Region IV EPA officials have interpreted the
term "high quality" waters, for ONRW purposes, to have the same
level of water quality as Tier II waters.69 This definition not only
undermines the rationale behind a pyramid antidegradation struc-
ture but also renders the ONRW designation insignificant because
62. The examples of "waters of exceptional recreational or ecological significance,"
id., are inadequate.
63. See infra Part III.A.2 for a discussion of Florida's solution.
64. See Morgan, supra note 18, at 31.
65. See Preamble to Part 131, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,400, 51,403 (1983); 40 C.F.R. § 131.12.
66. Preamble to Part 131, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,400, 51,403 (1983).
67. See Morgan, supra note 18, at 31.
68. The EPA has ten regional offices which are accountable to the EPA Administrator
and are responsible for all EPA activities within their geographic regions. See EPA (last
modified Dec. 29, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/epahome/locate2.htm>.
69. See REGION IV, U.S. EPA, QuESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF TIER
III OF THE FEDERAL ANTIDEGRADATION POLICY: PROTECTION OF OUTSTANDING NATIONAL
RESOURCE WATERS (April 20, 1989). The EPA's Region IV jurisdiction includes Georgia,
Florida, Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama, North Carolina, Mississippi, and South Carolina.
See EPA (last modified Dec. 29, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/epahome/locate2.htm>.
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states are likely to choose, all things being equal, to place a water
body in the lower tier which imposes fewer restrictions on the fu-
ture use of that water body.7 °
Both the structure and wording of the EPA's ONRW regula-• • 71
tion contradict this interpretation. It is redundant to classify
Tier III waters as equivalent to Tier II waters. Certainly the EPA,
which drafted the CWA implementing regulations, would have
either referred to Tier II waters in its ONRW provision or incor-
porated the Tier II language into the ONRW subsection had it
intended the two antidegradation categories to be equivalent.
72
The pinnacle position that ONRWs occupy in the antidegrada-
tion pyramid, combined with the regulation's mandate that states
implement federally compliant antidegradation schemes, indi-
cates that the ONRWs' "high [water] quality" requirement be
both honored and maintained at a level above that of Tier II wa-
73ters.
Because states cannot easily decipher the EPA's cryptic ONRW
definition and may be reluctant to expand the definition to cor-
relate with the preamble, 74 the solution is to define very
specifically in a CWA amendment what waters qualify for ONRW
status and to implement identification and enforcement proc-
esses75 to ensure that qualifying waters actually receive the
designation. The ONRW definition should emphasize ecological
significance by defining specific water quality standard parame-
ters that, if met, automatically place a water body within the top
S 76
tier.
2. Economic Considerations-Economic opportunity costs
accompany the ONRW classification because ONRWs benefit
from a total or near total ban77 on new or increased
70. Unless a state chooses to place a premium on very high water quality, an unlikely
event in light of existing empirical evidence which indicates that most states' ONRW cate-
gories are rated as less protective than the federal ONRW standard and that few waters
receive the designation, the highest quality waters will likely be placed in a lower tier. See
discussion infta Part IIA2. Environmental concerns are hampered by typical collective
action problems. Although citizens who live next to bodies of water or use them for recrea-
tion might desire high antidegradation protection for those waters, the majority of people
are unlikely to take actions necessary to accomplish such a result. Governments want the
flexibility to accept industrial proposals and tax dollars. See id.
71. See 40 C.F.R § 131.12(a) (3) (1996).
72. See Morgan, supra note 18, at 31.
73. See id.
74. See id. (describing Alabama's rejection ofjust such a definition).
75. See discussion infra Part III.
76. See discussion infra Part III.A. 1.
77. The extent of the ban depends on which interpretation of the ONRW definition
one chooses to adopt. Although an official EPA version exists that allows no new discharges,
SPING 1999]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
discharges.78 The ONRW classification constructively prevents new
industry from locating along a water's shores and prohibits
existing industries from expanding their output. The ban creates
an economic disincentive for state regulators to advocate for the
ONRW classification.
In a 1992 survey of state environmental agencies,79 the National
Wildlife Federation (NWF) discovered that states have designated
approximately 0.37 percent of the Nation's river miles as ONRWs
within the federal classification and another 3.16 percent under
state outstanding resource waters (ORW) designations.0 The fed-
eral antidegradation guidelines do not provide objective
81guidelines for states to apply in their own classification schemes.
As a result, state ORW designations may or may not be as protec-
tive as the federal ONRW designation.82 The low numbers in the
survey indicate that either states have failed to classify deserving
waters as ORWs or ONRWs or that the designations are underin-
clusive.
The NWF asked the states with state ORW classifications to
compare their programs with the federal ONRW designation. 83 Of
the twenty-eight states with state classification schemes, only two
rated their programs "more protective" than the federal designa-
tion.84 Thirteen rated their programs "as protective," and ten rated
their programs "less protective."85 The NWF discovered, upon fur-
ther examination, that the ten states rating their state ORW
designations as "less protective" than the federal ONRW standard
were, ironically, the same states reporting the highest numbers of
rivers miles protected under state ORW designations."6 Thus, many
waters designated ORWs under state schemes do not receive pro-
tection equivalent to the federal ONRW requirements. For this
many states have modified that interpretation to allow certain new or expanded discharges.
See Morgan, supra note 18, at 33 (discussing Florida's decision to allow discharges that, with
new technology, enhance the water quality of ONRWs) (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-
4.242(3) (b)) (1999).
78. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a) (3) (1996).
79. The NWF learned that, of the forty-six states that responded to the survey, eight
states utilize the federal ONRW classification, twenty states utilize a "state outstanding re-
source waters classification," and eight states utilize both the federal classification and a
state classification. WATERS AT RISK, supra note 15, at 13-14. Eight states indicated that they
have no legal authority to designate outstanding resource waters. See id. The answers of the
other two states reflected uncertainty. See id.
80. See id. at 17.
81. See discussion supra Part IIA 1.
82. SeeWATERS AT RISK, supra note 15, at 17.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 18.
85. See id.
86. See id.
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reason, Congress should amend the CWA to include a more spe-
cific ONRW definition so that the EPA can more readily determine
whether state ORW classifications are at least as protective as the
federal ONRW designation.
The current federal antidegradation policy makes it much easier
for state officials to maintain the status quo than to update their
water quality standards. State officials understand and appreciate
the value of their states' pristine waters, but such an appreciation
of natural resources, by itself, cannot protect waters that deserve to
be ONRWs. Congress recognized that a protective water quality
designation scheme is the necessary and appropriate solution.ss A
pristine water body may be empirically qualified for the ONRW
designation, but political considerations such as the attraction of
new industry to the area may argue against its inclusion in the pro-
tective class. Even states that are identified with tourism and water
activities are vulnerable to competing interests.8
The federal antidegradation scheme, buttressed by the EPA's in-
terpretation of its enforcement role as a passive one,90 provides
state legislatures and executives the tools with which to circumvent
the most protective designation. While state programs must con-
tain antidegradation policies and designations which are consistent
with the federal program, they are consistent in name only because
the federal regulations do not contain percentage guidelines or
objective definitional requirements.9' In other words, states must
have a program which contains Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III waters,
but no provision or check exists for the EPA to ensure that states
actually place water bodies within these appropriate designations2
or that waters placed within the antidegradation tiers are protected
as strictly as the EPA's regulations require.s
Therefore, states may rationalize that the only distinction be-
tween the three tiers concerns the accompanying restrictions on
new and increased pollution discharge limitations.94 A state decid-
ing how to classify one of its most pristine bodies of water could
87. See discussion infra Part II.C for a discussion of the problems associated with the
EPA's review of state water quality submissions.
88. See discussion supra Part I.
89., For example, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin have refused a NWF request to
consider placing Lake Superior into the ONRW category. See infra text accompanying note
104.
90. See discussion infra Part III.C.
91. See discussion supra Part I.
92. See infra Part II.C for a discussion of the ineffective EPA triennial review require-
ment.
93. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
94. See discussion supra Part IA
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rationally label that water body as a Tier II water in order to re-
serve the possibility of locating a new industry on the banks of that
water body. The state could, therefore, entice new industry without
creating potential discharge permit problems because the water
quality of Tier II waters may be degraded "to accommodate impor-
tant economic... development in the area in which the waters are
located."95
Some state legislatures have avoided challenges to their failure
to utilize the Tier III designation by further bifurcating their an-
tidegradation schemes.96  Michigan created a Tier II 1/297
classification "to provide a very high level of water quality protec-
tion without precluding unforeseen future economic and social
development considerations."9 8 In NWF v. Browner,99 the D.C. Cir-
cuit approved Michigan's failure to designate Lake Superior as an
ONRW, o because Michigan had afforded Lake Superior Tier II
1/2 protection.1°1 By adopting a midpoint designation that is more
protective than the federal Tier II standard and less protective
than the federal Tier III standard,0 2 Michigan was able to avoid the
potential economic hamstring of a Tier III water designation. The
Browner case created precedent for court approval of state avoid-
ance of the ONRW designation.
B. No Response to Citizen Petitions to Designate Waters
for Antidegradation Protection
NWFv. Brownerwas born of a haphazard response by the State of
Michigan to a request that it revise its water quality standards.1 0 3 On
February 1, 1991, the NWF asked Michigan, Minnesota, and Wis-
consin to consider designating Lake Superior as an ONRW during
95. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a) (2) (1996).
96. See, e.g., MICH. ENVTL., HEALTH & SAFETY REGS. r. 323.1098(7)(1996) (creating a
Tier II 1/2 between high quality waters and ONRWs); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-1-
05(A) (9) (1998) (creating five antidegradation levels called "General high quality waters,"
"Superior high quality waters," "State resource waters," ONRWs, and "outstanding high
quality waters").
97. See MICH. ENVTL., HEALTH & SAFETY REGS. r. 323.1098(7); see also Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d. 1126, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
98. Browner, 127 F.3d at 1127 (quoting HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 4-2).
99. No. CIV.A/95-1811, 1996 WL 601451, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 1996), affd, 127 F.3d
1126 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
100. See Browner, 127 F.3d at 1126.
101. See id. at 1127 (citing HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 4-2).
102. SeeMICH. ENVTL., HEALTH & SAFETY REGS. r. 323.1098(7) (1996).
103. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
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their triennial reviews.1 0 4 After receiving no reply, the NWF for-
mally petitioned each state to designate Lake Superior as an
ONRW on October 25, 1994. ' 5 Shortly thereafter, the NWF re-
quested that the Michigan Department of Natural Resources
(MDNR) seek public comment and conduct hearings prior to any
decision on the ONRW proposal.0 6 The MDNR refused to con-
sider the request. 7 Subsequently, the EPA refused to entertain a
NWF request to approve or disapprove of Michigan's rejection of
the ONRW designation for Lake Superior. lOs The NWF countered
by filing a citizen suit 0 9 against the EPA,"10 which alleged that the
EPA, pursuant to its CWA implementing regulations, was under a
mandatory duty to review and either approve or disapprove of state
decisions to maintain existing water quality standards."'
In Browner, Michigan informed the NWF of its intention not to
hold public hearings on its petition," 3 but neither the CWA nor
the EPA's regulations require any response by a state to a citizen
petition. A state's failure to entertain a citizen's petition to review
an existing water quality designation is problematic for two rea-
sons. First, state environmental agencies are not accountable to the
public for their inaction. Second, a water body's antidegradation
designation becomes totally dependent upon the EPA's unfettered
discretion whether or not to review the state's decision to maintain
the status quo. Without a legislative mandate that directs states to
respond and provide specific feedback to the petitioners regarding
the reasons for rejection in a timely manner, other states may
104. SeeAppellant's Brief, supra note 33, at 5.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 6.
107. See id. In February, 1995, Michigan denied the petition, writing to the NWF that
the state "'does not think it is appropriate or necessary to hold public hearings to discuss
your request ... since we do not intend to proceed with the designation.'" Id.
108. See id. at 6-7. Plaintiffs NWF, Great Lakes United, and Michigan United Conserva-
tion Clubs sought to compel the EPA to review and evaluate Michigan's water quality
standards. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, No. CIV.A/95-1811, 1996 WL 601451, at *1
(D.D.C. Oct. 11, 1996).
109. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (b) (1994) (allowing citizen suits against the EPA for fail-
ure to fulfill statutory nondiscretionary duties under the CWA); 40 C.F.R. § 135.2 (1996)
(including the same citizen suit provision).
110. The suit was brought pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2)(1994), which allows suits
by private citizens "where there is alleged a failure of the [EPA] Administrator to perform
any act or duty under [the Act] which is not discretionary with the Administrator." Id.
111. The NWF relied on the language in 40 C.F.R. § 131.20(c)(1996) to make the ar-
gument that the EPA has a mandatory duty to examine the results of all triennial review
results "for review and approval." SeeAppellant's Brief, supra note 33, at 9.
112. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1127-28 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
Browner, 1996 WL 601451 at *6.
113. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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follow Michigan's lead and refuse to consider requests by citizens
to review water quality standards.
C. No Review of "Existing" State Antidegradation Programs
Despite Deteriorating Waters
Arguing a theory of constructive submission, 114 the NWF alleged
in Browner that the CWA imposes a non-discretionary duty upon
the EPA to review Michigan's failure to act because such a failure is
tantamount to a final decision to refuse to redesignate Lake Supe-
rior as a Tier III water." 5 The EPA countered that it had no
mandatory duty to review the results of states' triennial water qual-
ity standards submissions which maintain the status quo."6 First,
the Agency argued that the duty to review new and revised water
quality decisions was created under the EPA's own regulations, and
was therefore, not a proper basis for a CWA citizen suit.1"7 Alterna-
tively, the EPA argued that, even if the Agency does have a
mandatory duty to review existing water quality standards submit-
ted as part of a state's triennial review, its regulation provides that
the state does not have to submit the results of its review until the
review is complete.1 8 The EPA admitted, however, that it enforces
no specific deadlines upon states to complete and submit their tri-
114. The theory, discussed supra note 34, was originally crafted to allow the EPA to re-
view state pollutant discharge levels when states failed to submit required reports under 33
U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1994). Section 1313(d) governs the maximum level for daily discharge of
pollutants, called total maximum -daily loads (TMDLs), into certain waters. See § 1313(d).
The TMDL framework is identical to the framework for water quality standards. States must
establish TMDLs and then submit them to the EPA for approval, triggering a mandatory
duty to approve or disapprove those standards by the EPA. See id. § 1313(d)(1), (2). The
constructive submission theory was applied in Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th
Cir. 1984), where the court found the theory necessary because it was unwilling to allow
"[s]tate inaction amounting to a refusal to act... [to] stand in the way of successfully
achieving the goals of federal anti-pollution policy." Id. at 998; see also Sierra Club v.
Browner, 843 F. Supp. 1304, 1312 (D. Minn. 1993); Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly, 762 F.
Supp. 1422, 1424 (W.D. Wash. 1991). As discussed, supra Part I, both the antidegradation
policy and the anti-pollution policy are included under the CWA's water quality standards
umbrella. Therefore, the NWF argued in Browner, the constructive submission doctrine
should be equally applicable to both policies. See Browner, 1996 WL 601451, at *4; see also
Browner, 127 F.3d at 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
115. See Browner, 127 F.3d at 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Browner, 1996 WL 601451, at
*4.
116. See Browner, 127 F.3d at 1127-28.
117. See Brief for Appellee at 12, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
118. See id. at 10 (citing 40 C.F.R. 131.20(c)).
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ennial reviews and that states have no obligation to submit indi-
vidual decisions as they are made." 9 In sum, the EPA's position was
that states are required to submit triennial review results, but not
every three years as long as a review is ongoing, and that when tri-
ennial review results are submitted, those that maintain the status
quo are only reviewable at the EPA's discretion.
Citing administrative deference, the appellate court refused to
apply the constructive submission doctrine because it believed that
the EPA's decision not to evaluate existing state water quality stan-
dards was purely discretionary.120 Consequently, Browner illuminates
some serious practical problems in the enforcement of the federal
antidegradation policy. Under the CWA, states have an affirmative
duty to conduct triennial reviews of their water quality standards 2'
and to submit them to the EPA for review.22 The EPA has a duty to
review triennial review submissions that adopt new or revised water
quality standards to determine if they are consistent with the CWA
and the EPA's regulations within sixty days, 12 3 and the Agency must
notify the state "not later than the ninetieth day after the date of
submission" of a standard that is inconsistent with the federal stan-
dard and specify the changes necessary to meet federal
requirements. 2 4 Because the CWA does not explicitly require the
EPA to review state triennial submissions that maintain the status
125quo, however, the EPA's argument that it has no affirmative duty
to review such submissions unfortunately has merit.
Therefore, according to the EPA and the D.C. Circuit, a state
can refuse to comply with the public notice and petition provisions
of the Act and its regulations, 1 6 can ignore triennial review
119. See id. ("The statute and regulations require the states to hold public hearings at
least every three years to review their standards, but there is no specific deadline for com-
pletion of that review.... [T]he citizens' suit provision is limited to enforcement of clear-
cut and readily ascertainable mandatory duties." (citing Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d
783, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1987))).
120. See Browner, 127 F.3d. at 1128-29. The question left unanswered was whether citi-
zen suits may challenge an agency's failure to comply with a mandatory regulatory duty as
well as a failure to comply with a mandatory statutorily-created duty, which is of course re-
quired. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1994) (allowing citizen suits against the EPA for failure
to fulfill statutory nondiscretionary duties under the CWA).
121. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (1994).
122. See id. § 1313(c) (1), (2) (providing the EPA with statutory oversight authority over
the states' triennial reviews).
123. Seeid. § 1313(c)(3).
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. But see id. § 1313(c)(1) ("The Governor of a State ... shall ... hold public hear-
ings for the purpose of reviewing applicable water quality standards and, as appropriate,
modifying and adopting standards."); 40 C.F.R. § 131.20(a) (1996) ("The State shall...
hold public hearings for the purpose of reviewing applicable water quality standards.... .").
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requirements,2 and has no duty to submit results to the EPA.128
Despite evidence of water quality deterioration or citizen interest
in revising standards, a state may ignore both the procedural
requirements and the practical goals behind the EPA's own
antidegradation policy, with express EPA approval.
Because the CWA does not delineate specific deadlines with
which states must comply in submitting the results of their trien-
nial reviews, states never have to submit results to the EPA if they
are always in the midst of an on-going triennial review. For exam-
ple, since the creation of the triennial review process in 1973,
Michigan has completed and submitted results for only one trien-
nial review. 29 Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit found that the EPA
was under no duty to review Michigan's water quality designations
because Michigan had not submitted either new or revised stan-
dards.2 ° Despite the EPA's concession that states are required to
submit existing water quality standards to the EPA upon comple-
tion of triennial reviews,' 3 the D.C. Circuit concluded that "states
are only required to submit existing water quality standards to the
EPA to enable it to make an informed decision about whether to
exercise its discretion [under § 303 (c) (4) (B)] to supplant the state
standards."
32
The EPA argued in its brief that it does not have time to review
the existing water quality standards of fifty states. 13 If the EPA is
overwhelmed with existing mandatory duties, it certainly must
not have time to conduct discretionary reviews of existing an-
tidegradation standards, which may not have been revised since
the 1970s.1M By accepting the EPA's interpretation of its "non-
existent duty" to review existing standards, regardless of the
status, viability, and effectiveness of those standards, the courts
127. But see § 1313(c)(1) ("The Governor of a State . .. shall from time to time (but at
least once each three year period beginning with October 18, 1972) ... review[] applicable
water quality standards ... ").
128. But see 40 C.F.R. § 131.20(c) (1996) ("The State shall submit the results of the re-
view... to the Regional Administrator for review and approval, within 30 days of the final
State action to adopt and certify the revised standard, or if no revisions are made as a result of
the review, within 30 days of the completion of the review." (emphasis added)).
129. SeeAppellant's Brief, supra note 33, at 19.
130. SeeNat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
131. See40 C.F.R. § 131.22(b) (1996).
132. 127 F.3d at 1130.
133. SeeAppellee's Brief, supra note 117, at 15 ("If the agency were compelled to review
every state's decision to preserve existing water quality standards and make approval deci-
sions within the timeframes NWF submits are required, EPA would be overwhelmed by the
vast scope of such an obligation.").
134. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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have allowed the Agency to undermine the intentions 
of the
CWA's antidegradation 
policy.
III. PROPOSED REFORM
Congress' goal of keeping clean waters clean is failing 
on three
fronts. First, states lack adequate guidance in implementing 
and
managing state antidegradation programs.
1 6 An amendment to the
CWA that provides states with specific, objective definitions of wa-
ters deserving the ONRW designation can provide 
the certainty
states need.
Second, states are not held accountable for failing 
to comply
with the CWA's requirements to conduct triennial 
water quality
hearings and reviews.
13
' A second amendment to the CWA requir-
ing states to meet specific triennial review submission 
deadlines
and requiring state agencies to make detailed replies 
to citizen pe-
titioners will hold states accountable for noncompliance.
Third, the EPA is not currently accountable for 
ensuring that
states comply with the CWA's water quality standards 
submission
requirements."" A CWA amendment requiring 
the EPA to review
new, revised, and existing state water quality standards 
every three
years will hold the EPA accountable for state 
noncompliance. An
amendment to the CWA will prevent the EPA 
from arguing, as it
did in Browner9 that citizen suits may not be filed 
to force the EPA
to follow agency regulations.
A. Creating an Objective ONRW Definition
The EPA's antidegradation regulations require 
states to adopt
plans that are consistent with, or more protective 
than, the
requirements for each Tier in the EPA's 
antidegradation
pyramid.14° States have had difficulty interpreting 
the federal
definition of the ONRW, forcing them to independently 
define the
135. See supra note 24.
136. See discussion supra Part II.A.
137. See discussion supra Part II.B.
138. See id.
139. See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
140. See discussion supra Section I.B.
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term.1 4 1 In recent years, the Great* Lakes States and Florida have
endeavored to achieve clearer antidegradation definitions in order
to protect water quality. 142 Because all of America's waters ,are
dependent upon the cooperation and consistency of all the states'
water quality policies, the Great Lakes Initiative (GLI) and
Florida's Water Quality Standards provide models worthy of
emulation.
1. The Great Lakes Initiative Approach-The GLI, which aspires to
improve the water quality of the Great Lakes, is the most recently
publicized effort at antidegradation definition uniformity.143 Con-
cerned with the effectiveness of the EPA's water quality regulations
of the Great Lakes, Congress enacted the Great Lakes Critical Pro-
grams Act of 1990.'44 The Act amended § 118(c) (2) of the CWA to
require the EPA to publish new guidance on water quality stan-
dards and implementation procedures for the Great Lakes. 145 This
guidance, commonly called the GLI, is officially known as the
"Final Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System."' 4 As
required by the CWA, the GLI establishes minimum water quality
standards, antidegradation policies, and implementation proce-
dures for the Great Lakes.
147
The GLI's antidegradation policy requires that "water quality
cannot be degraded below the level protecting existing uses, which
are defined as any uses that a water body has actually supported
since 1975." 4s For example, if a water body maintained a fishery at
any time since 1975, even if the fishery is no longer in existence,
no discharges are allowed into the water that would impact the wa-
ter quality level needed for a fishery.' 49
The GLI's antidegradation policy prohibits increased discharges
of chemicals into ONRWs but allows discharges in all other waters
that exceed the minimum quality standard of "fishable/swimmable"
141. See discussion supra Part ILA; see also Final Water Quality Guidance for the Great
Lakes System, 60 Fed. Reg. 15366, 15413 (1995) [hereinafter GLI] (adopting a new defini-
tion of ONRW in an effort to establish consistency in antidegradation schemes of states
bordering the Great Lakes); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-4.242, 302.200-302.700 (1999).
142. See GLI, supra note 141; FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-4.242, 302.200-302.700
(1999).
143. See Lisa K. Kunkle, Comment, Interstate Water Quality Conflicts and the Great Lakes
Initiative: Is it the Solution to Calming the Waters?, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 457, 468 (1994).
144. Pub. L. No. 101-596, 104 Stat. 3000, 3000-04 (1990).
145. See33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
146. GLI, supra note 141, at 15366.
147. See id.; see also 58 Fed. Reg. 20,802, 20,823 (1993) (proposed Apr. 16, 1993).
148. John Knox, Comment, The EPA's Proposed Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes
System: A Uniform and Stringent Solution, 4 DICK.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 89, 99 (1994) (citations
omitted).
149. See id.
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only if states follow detailed procedures to demonstrate that dis-
charges are necessary for important social and economic
development.1 50 This provision reduces the flexibility the Great
Lakes States enjoyed under the EPA's antidegradation regulations
to develop intermediate levels of protection in their antidegrada-
tion schemes. By requiring states to satisfy detailed procedures to
obtain the EPA's permission to increase discharges, the GLI's pol-
icy limits the ability of states to favor economic interests that
conflict with a water body's antidegradation level.
The GLI expands the definition of ONRW. It states:
Waters that may be considered for designation as Outstand-
ing National Resource Waters include, but are not limited to,
water bodies that are recognized as:
Important because of protection through official action, such
as Federal or State law, Presidential or secretarial action, inter-
national treaty, or interstate compact; Having exceptional
recreational significance;
Having exceptional ecological significance;
Having other special environmental, recreational, or ecologi-
cal attributes; or waters whose designation as Outstanding
National Resource Waters is reasonably necessary for the pro-
tection of other waters so designated. 5'
The expanded ONRW definition includes important waters rec-
ognized by federal and international authorities and provides
additional examples of potentially qualifying water bodies. It pre-
serves the requirement that absolutely no degradation of such
waters is allowed except for rare short-term (i.e., weeks or months)
exceptions.' 52 Although the GLI does not include a provision that
requires states to consider upgrading waters to higher tiers,' 3 the
GLI antidegradation scheme diminishes the incentive to avoid the
ONRW designation by requiring states to satisfy a strict test to gain
150. See GLI, supra note 141, at 15414 (requiring states to submit an "antidegradation
demonstration" that includes a "pollution prevention alternatives analysis," an "alternative
or enhanced treatment analysis," an "important social or economic development analysis,"
and a "special provision for remedial actions" report).
151. Id. at 15413.
152. See id. For example, a state might receive permission to temporarily degrade water
quality while repairing an aging bridge.
153. Notice that the GLI's definition of ONRW lists types of waters that "may," as op-
posed to "shall," be designated as ONRWs. See supra text accompanying note 151.
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approval from the EPA to diminish the water quality of any water
that exceeds minimum standards.
54
The Council of Great Lakes Governors was particularly unhappy
with the GLI's definition of "High Quality Water[s]" (HQW) 5
waters which are afforded protection to "support the propagation
of fish, shellfish, and wildlife; and recreation in and on the wa-
ter."15 6 The Governors were critical of the definition because each
state had developed its own HQW definition when implementing
its antidegradation pyramid scheme.5 7 As a result, the GLI re-
quired each state to make adjustments to its existing policy to
accommodate the GLI's uniform antidegradation policy, thus ex-
panding the scope of the EPA's governing regulations and limiting
states' flexibility 8
Although the GLI's antidegradation approach is encouraging, it
may not go far enough to ensure that the nation's most pristine
waters are adequately protected under the ONRW umbrella. For
instance, Michigan never formally considered the NWF's Lake Su-
perior ONRW proposal.' 59 Browner, a post-GLI case involving a
Great Lakes State, indicates that states may still view the ONRW
label as the equivalent of economic suicide with regard to luring
industry dollars to the state. States may approve new discharge
permits for Tier II waters as long as the future discharge will not
lower water quality below that required to maintain a post-1975
designated use.' 6° Even if the discharge may lower the water quality
below such a threshold, states may still gain the EPA's approval to
grant the permit if they satisfy the detailed procedures outlined in
the GLI. 61 In short, ONRWs remain bodies of water which allow no
long-term degradation. The incentive to avoid such a designation,
although diminished somewhat, exists and will remain until states
are required to fit qualifying waters into the designation. This can
be accomplished by adopting an objective definition for waters of
"exceptional recreational or ecological significance" and requiring
states to identify and place qualifying waters into the ONRW des-
ignation.
154. See GLI, supra note 141, at 15414.
155. See id. at 15413 ("High quality waters are water bodies in which, on a parameter by
parameter basis, the quality of the waters exceeds levels necessary to support propagation of
fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation in and on the water.").
156. Id.
157. See Kunkle, supra note 143, at 474-76 (discussing the different HQW definitions
used by Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin).
158. See id. at 476.
159. See discussion supra Part II.B.
160. See GLI, supra note 141, at 15412-13.
161. See id. at 15414.
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2. Florida's Approach-Florida's antidegradation scheme goes
further than the GLI in providing protection to its high quality wa-
ters. 62 The Florida regulations 6 3 successfully add substance to the
EPA's ONRW regulation in at least two ways.1 64 First, Florida's
ONRW regulation defines "exceptional recreational and ecological
significance." 6 5  Recreationally significant waters must be of
"unusual value as a resource for outdoor recreation activities."' 66
Ecologically significant waters must be a part of an "ecosystem of
unusual value." 67 Both must be such that "water quality should be
maintained and protected under [almost] all circumstances."
168
These definitions are improvements because they provide more
detailed examples than the federal definition.
Second, the Florida regulations require an ONRW designation
to contain a favorable cost-benefit analysis which weighs environ-
mental, social, and economic benefits against related costs.169
Although no body of water is automatically included in the ONRW
category, Florida does have definite guidelines and procedures
that assess water quality in terms of opportunity costs. 1 70 Florida has
also improved upon the EPA's presumption against new or ex-
panded discharges into ONRWs by creating an incentive for
aspiring industrial leaders to develop and utilize technology that
improves water quality.7 ' A discharge exception allows increased
or new discharges if water quality is enhanced by those discharges. 2
3. A New ONRW Definition-Congress should look to the an-
tidegradation approaches of the GLI and Florida to re-define
ONRW. The GLI provides an expanded definition of ONRW and
162. See Morgan, supra note 18, at 5, 32-35 (describing Florida's ONRW policy).
163. SeeFLA.ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-4.242, 302.200-302.700 (1999).
164. Florida's environmental regulations give its equivalent to the EPA, the Environ-
mental Regulation Commission (ERC), the authority to designate ONRWs rather than
merely to recommend such a designation to the Florida legislature. See id. r. 62-302.400(8),
302.700(6). The obvious benefit of this provision is that, because the ERC, unlike the Flor-
ida legislature, is only concerned about environmental matters, its decisionmaking is
theoretically free from accommodating other non-environmental interests. While this ap-
proach is recommended to all states, it is not suggested in the reform section of this Note
because the Note's focus concerns proposals for reforming the CWA which could not con-
tain such a mandate to the states without raising serious state sovereignty issues.
165. Id. r. 62-302.200(10), (11). Although, these definitions are still somewhat vague,
they are more specific than those in the federal standard. Cf 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(3)
(1996).
166. FLA. ADMIN. CODE AiN. r. 62-302.200(11).
167. Id. r. 62-302.200(10).
168. Id. r. 62-302.200(18).
169. See id. r. 62-302.400(9), 302.700(6)(c).
170. See id.
171. See id. r. 62-4.242(3) (b).
172. See id.
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makes it harder for states to allow increased pollutant discharges
into protected waters. Florida's regulations provide an even more
specific ONRW definition, incorporate a cost-benefit analysis into
the ONRW designation process, and empower its state environ-
mental agency to designate ONRWs. An improved hybrid of these
two approaches, which includes objective criteria, will solve the
problems associated with the vague and uncertain federal ONRW
provision.
The new definition of ONRW should be quantifiable so that
states can objectively classify their waters. The new ONRW defini-
tion should contain specific numeric benchmarks for important
pollutants so that, when a water body's quality meets these objec-
tive criteria, states must automatically place it within the ONRW
category. Because the EPA has already established numeric criteria
for numerous pollutants in the GLI as part of its two-tiered meth-
odology to protect aquatic life, wildlife, and human health in the
Great Lakes,7 the Agency is more than capable of developing such
benchmarks. 7 4 In addition to providing specific guidance with
which states can comply, the new ONRW definition would also im-
prove the EPA's reviews of state water quality submissions because
the Agency could quickly and easily determine whether states have
placed their waters in the appropriate antidegradation categories.
Congress should amend the CWA to require the EPA to establish
numeric pollution benchmarks for waters that deserve ONRW pro-
tection.
B. Amending the Citizen Suit Provision to Include a Timely Reply Re-
quirement and Publication of Specific Findings
The regulation governing citizen petitions for ONRW designa-
tions is inadequate in light of Browner's holding that a state is
under no obligation to review, hold hearings, or reply to antide-
gradation redesignation requests.' 75 The Browner decision conflicts
173. See GLI, supra note 141, at 15373-75, 15386-412 (listing numeric criteria to pro-
tect aquatic life for 15 pollutants, numeric criteria to protect human health for 18
pollutants, and numeric criteria to protect wildlife for four pollutants).
174. It is beyond the scope of this Note to recommend which pollutants (and their ap-
propriate benchmarks) should be included within the new ONRW definition. The GLI
includes, among many others: Benzene, Chlorine, pH, Salinity, and quantity of suspended
solids. See id. at 15386-412.
175. SeeNat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126,1128 (D.C. Cir. 1997). But see 40
C.F.R. § 131.20(b) (1996). EPA's regulations governing procedures for review and revision
of water quality standards mandate that states "shall hold a public hearing for the purpose
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with the CWA and EPA's implementing regulations which require
states to conduct public hearings during their triennial reviews to
assess the adequacy of existing water quality standards in light of
improvements in technology, newly-distributed EPA guidance, and
legal developments. 1
6
The Browner court's view can be nullified, however, with an
amendment to the CWA which requires states to entertain citizen
petitions by holding public hearings within six months of a peti-
tion's submission. The new CWA provision should also require
states to reply to petitioners with their specific findings concerning
water quality designations at the conclusion of this six month pe-
riod after the public hearings are conducted to discuss the merits
of each petition. The amendment should require states to submit
results of all petitions considered during a three year period to the
EPA upon completion of the triennial review process. States
should be required to conduct reviews of all water quality stan-
dards for all water bodies within their borders every three calendar
years. This review can be a continuous process during that three
year time period as long as each water body's antidegradation des-
ignation is reviewed once in that timeframe.1"
Courts should ensure that states strictly comply with the pro-
posed amendments. The federal antidegradation policy, bolstered
by strong, specific CWA requirements and enforcement, will pro-
vide an adequate incentive to states to fully and faithfully comply
with their duties to conduct meaningful triennial reviews of their
water quality standards.
C. Requiring the EPA to Review the Results
of All State Triennial Reviews
Congress should amend the CWA to require states to submit wa-
ter quality review results to the EPA at least every three years and
to require the EPA to review those results, whether or not states
of reviewing water quality standards" and that "[t] he proposed water quality standards revi-
sion and supporting analyses shall be made available to the public prior to the hearing." Id.
176. See HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 6-23. See also Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Re-
sources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1277 (5th Cir. 1980) (describing the triennial review as a
means to adjust and upgrade water quality standards).
177. The EPA could review state water quality submissions in cycles of three, by requir-
ing each state to submit the water quality standards of 1/3 of its waters every year or by
requiring 1/3 of the states to submit their entire water quality standard reviews each year.
Either procedure would require states to submit their entire standards once every three
years.
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have elected to revise their standards. Additionally, courts should
recognize the constructive submission theory78 to trigger an EPA
duty to review daily pollution discharge levels following a state's
long-term refusal to establish and submit water quality standards.'
79
Recognizing the doctrine would either promote action by both the
states and the EPA or provide a necessary mechanism for inter-
ested parties to hold them accountable for a failure to act.
A state's failure to review its water quality standards for any body
of water within three years should be interpreted as an automatic
decision to maintain the status quo. The EPA should then be re-
quired to review that inaction in a light most favorable to the
designation of a higher antidegradation category. This presump-
tion would provide an additional incentive for states to conduct
meaningful reviews. The EPA should give special consideration to
water bodies that were subjects of citizen redesignation petitions
during the triennial review period to encourage the participation
of concerned citizens in the preservation of natural resources.
The amendment and the EPA's use of the constructive submis-
sion doctrine will ensure that the EPA conducts thorough and
conscientious reviews of state antidegradation programs every
three years. This cooperative framework will help reduce the cur-
rent economic incentive to maintain the status quo and to avoid
the upward redesignation of quality waters within the antidegrada-
tion pyramid. This new accountability will also force the EPA to
recognize that its duty to review is not discretionary.
CONCLUSION
Since passage of the Clean Water Act [twenty six] years ago,
government and industry have undertaken a massive national
effort to clean up pollution of [lakes, rivers, wetlands, and es-
tuaries]. While much remains to be done, significant progress
has been made and many once-polluted waters now comply
with minimum standards. The Clean Water Act established a
two-track national policy: attain minimum standards in pol-
178. See discussion supra Part II.C.; see also Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 998
(7th Cir. 1984).
179. The framework for the establishment of total maximum daily loads (TMDLs), see
33 U.S.C. §.1313(d) (1),(2) (1994), is analogous to the framework for the establishment of
water quality standards. A state must establish TMDLs and submit them to the EPA for re-
view. See id. The EPA must either approve or disapprove the TMDLs within thirty days of the
state's submission and must promulgate new TMDLs for the state in the event of disap-
proval. See id.
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luted waters; and maintain high water quality in pristine lakes,
rivers, estuaries, and coastal waters. °80
Maintaining the quality of America's most pristine bodies of wa-
ter is a national priority."" Yet, empirical evidence shows that the
CWA's antidegradation policy is not keeping clean waters clean.
8
1
The ultimate result of this failure will be a national system of wa-
ters meeting only minimum water quality standards. 8 3 To prevent
such a consequence, the federal antidegradation policy must be-
come a workable procedure in which waters are both initially
placed in the appropriate protective category and subsequently
monitored to avoid deterioration. A CWA amendment and the
EPA's use of the constructive submission doctrine will empower
the federal antidegradation policy.
By providing more specific definitions for water quality catego-
ries and by adding statutory mandates for the states and the EPA,
Congress can empower the currently stagnant antidegradation pol-
icy. Timely state submissions of water quality standards,
involvement of interested citizen groups, and review of revised and
existing standards by the EPA will ensure that the CWA's antide-
gradation policy achieves its goal of keeping clean waters clean.
180. WATERS AT RisK, supra note 15, at Forward (quoting Jay D. Hair, former President
of the National Wildlife Federation (May, 1992)).
181. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1994).
182. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
183. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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